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To the Editors:
David Martin Jones and Michael Smith argue that the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) is only “making process, not progress.”1 In their view, ASEAN schol-
ars and regional scholars who have faith in the development of an ASEAN community
should nonetheless acknowledge that the association has not achieved much in three
important areas: economic integration, antiterrorism cooperation, and relations with
China. Jones and Smith’s critical article deserves credit for revisiting these issues; the
authors, however, have an incomplete understanding of ASEAN.
With regard to economic integration and antiterrorism cooperation, Jones and Smith
are making issues out of nonissues. In other words, most ASEAN scholars and regional
scholars would probably not object to the claim that ASEAN diplomacy has not borne
fruit in these two areas, but this is not surprising given that they are new areas of
cooperation for its members. Nor does this lack of progress necessarily lead to the con-
clusion that ASEAN is insigniªcant. More likely, the scholars’ main focus is on the ac-
tivities of the Southeast Asian countries in the security ªeld, for example, intraregional
conªdence building and the management of ASEAN’s relations with external powers.
In this respect, I have two main concerns regarding Jones and Smith’s claim that
ASEAN’s attempt to promote its norms has been manipulated by China. First, the au-
thors do not acknowledge ASEAN’s success in socializing Beijing into its cooperative
security norm. Second, this oversight has profound implications for determining the
most serious security threat in Southeast Asia—the human security threat—and for un-
derstanding the complexity of this threat.
asean-china relations
Jones and Smith do not recognize ASEAN’s remarkable achievement in improving its
relations with China. Moreover, their view that ASEAN’s promotion of Asia-Paciªc
multilateralism has been manipulated by Beijing is inaccurate. ASEAN and China
have collaborated on developing a win-win approach by establishing a set of common
interests to enhance peace in the region. The former has guided the latter to pursue co-
operative security within frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) by
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demonstrating the value of its approach to regional cooperation. Thus, instead of being
manipulated by China, ASEAN has been engaged in socializing Beijing into its cooper-
ative security norm.
In their article Jones and Smith do not consider the process of mutual understanding
that has been developing between ASEAN and Beijing. In the wake of the end of
the Cold War, ASEAN was wary of China, and vice versa. Nevertheless, ASEAN in-
vited China to participate in forums such as the ARF in 1994 and the Council for
Security Cooperation in the Asia-Paciªc in 1996. Since then, their perceptions of each
other have improved. The pursuit by the minor powers in Southeast Asia of the 2003
Declaration on Strategic Partnership with Beijing is only one manifestation of their
growing ease in dealing with the mainland. A key item on the agenda includes ªnding
ways to strengthen military relations in such areas as high-level bilateral visits and per-
sonnel training.2
Jones and Smith should have considered two other factors that also reºect the pro-
cess of growing socialization between ASEAN and China. First, Beijing’s attitude to-
ward multilateralism gradually began to change a few years after the start of the ARF
process in 1994.3 In the ªrst half of the 1990s, China was highly skeptical of multilateral
cooperation. In the second half of the decade, however, it began to show a willingness
to address the Spratly Islands dispute in the ARF process, which involves other major
powers such as the United States. Beijing demonstrated its strong commitment to this
process by signing documents such as the declaration on a code of conduct in the South
China Sea in 2002 and ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003. These
developments suggest that the Chinese had begun to learn the value of multilateralism
after interacting with their Southeast Asian counterparts early in the ARF’s history, and
that they have increasingly been socialized into ASEAN’s norm since then.
Second, China’s pursuit of multilateralism may constrain its own power politics be-
havior, but not that of its rivals, in particular, the United States. Many scholars argue
that Beijing considers multilateralism a means to counter Washington’s unilateralism or
bilateralism.4 Remarkably, however, the Chinese have pursued multilateral cooperation
even in areas where the United States has not been involved. China’s decision to sign
the 2002 South China Sea Declaration is a case in point. Although this declaration has
no legal status, it is still a notable development, bearing in mind that what has been
achieved among the ASEAN members is also a nonlegal declaration.5 Moreover, China
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is now willing to start negotiations on a binding code of conduct.6 True, Beijing has not
abandoned its sovereignty claim to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, but nei-
ther have any of the Southeast Asian claimants. In addition, Beijing’s accession in 2003
to the TAC—regarded as a nonaggression pact—is notable, given that the TAC is a legal
agreement and that Washington has indicated no intention of acceding to it.
the most serious security threat
ASEAN’s improved relations with China, then, should not be underestimated. To do
so would be to obscure the complexity of what ought to be regarded as the most serious
security threat in Southeast Asia—that is, the lack of human security/human rights.
The human security threat in this region is serious precisely because ASEAN’s Asia-
Paciªc security initiative has borne fruit. The ASEAN-China concord is prolonging this
threat by making it difªcult for the Western powers to compel ASEAN to change its hu-
man rights practices. On the basis of the principle of noninterference in the internal af-
fairs of member states, ASEAN does little to address human rights abuses in these
states. The North American and European countries are critical of this practice, but they
have not been able to exercise much inºuence over ASEAN, despite their political and
economic weight. ASEAN has felt little need to address their criticisms because it can
now turn to China as an alternative partner. Unlike the Western powers, China does not
challenge ASEAN for its noninterference approach.
From Jones and Smith’s perspective, human security can only be seen as one of the
many issues that underline the limitations of ASEAN diplomacy. Yet the human secu-
rity issue also highlights an important achievement—that is, the concord between
ASEAN and China. If ASEAN were being manipulated by Beijing, as the authors claim,
its members would feel the need to rely on the Western powers and thus take their con-
cerns more seriously. If there were no ASEAN-China concord, the Western countries
should have had little difªculty in compelling ASEAN to change its policy.
The issue of Myanmar epitomizes the complexity of the human security threat in
Southeast Asia. The United States and the European Union have repeatedly urged
ASEAN to take punitive action against the Myanmar government. In response, in the
ARF and the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, the association has included in the chairper-
son’s statements and the joint communiqués clauses encouraging the Myanmar gov-
ernment to change its human rights practices. Thus far the Western powers have
taken punitive action only against Myanmar, and not against the association. The
Western powers have not been able to exercise inºuence over ASEAN because it has
created an environment that makes it difªcult for them to do so. While the Western
powers were raising concerns over Myanmar, ASEAN was strengthening its relations
with its new partner, China. The two parties issued the Joint Declaration on Strategic
Partnership in 2003. Moreover, since the two parties agreed to establish a free trade area
in 2002, their volume of trade with each other has increased dramatically.
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conclusion
Jones and Smith express skepticism over the ability of minor powers to enhance their
interests vis-à-vis major powers. For them, the norms advanced by the former can only
be what the latter make of them (pp. 182–184). The case of ASEAN, however, demon-
strates that minor powers can at times take advantage of their stronger partners. The
association is taking advantage of all of its partners, including China and the Western
powers. ASEAN’s approach is to avoid relying on a single external power, allowing it
to maintain its autonomy and enhancing its interests with all of its partners. Such an
approach is regarded as ASEAN’s “hedging” or “double-binding” strategy. Rather than
balancing the power of China or bandwagoning with a rising China, ASEAN is avoid-
ing the need to choose sides, and enmeshing both Beijing and the United States in re-
gional institutions.7
This is a satisfactory result from the perspective of the governments of ASEAN’s
members. In light of their national interests and regime security, ASEAN diplomacy has
been successful. However, the interests of the people of Southeast Asia, some of whom
have been subject to political oppression, remain unaddressed. ASEAN is making prog-
ress in terms of the interests of the governments of its member states, but not in terms
of the interests of their people. The complexity of the human security threat in this re-
gion can be understood only within the context of ASEAN’s achievement in its rela-
tions with Beijing.
—Hiro Katsumata
Bristol, United Kingdom
David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith Reply:
Hiro Katsumata has three main criticisms of our article.1 First, he asserts that we exag-
gerate the importance of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN’s) weak
economic integration and limited antiterrorism cooperation. His commentary, however,
does not undermine our central claim that ASEAN’s norm of noninterference has done
little to advance the establishment of an integrated community among ASEAN mem-
bers or in the wider region. In this context, the limitations of ASEAN security coopera-
tion to combat transnational terrorism do not seem irrelevant. A recent concern it may
be, but the fact that the effective prosecution of groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah re-
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quires bilateral cooperation with states outside the region reinforces our perception that
a pattern of communitarian rhetoric in ofªcial declarations disguises ASEAN’s state-
driven reality. That ASEAN remains an essentially state sovereignty–reinforcing organi-
zation becomes even more evident when we explore the lack of intraregional economic
integration, which is neither a peripheral nor a recent focus of ASEAN concern or
ASEAN commentary.
ASEAN came to international prominence primarily as a consequence of the high
performance of its “tiger” economies from 1987 to 1997. Since the Asian 1997 ªnancial
crisis, ASEAN has paid sedulous attention to promoting intra- and interregional
growth, extending its economic processes into an East Asian Community. As a recent
study shows, however, ASEAN states continue to trade more with the rest of the world
than they do with each other. Furthermore, the tendency of richer and more market-
friendly economies such as Singapore and Thailand to form bilateral agreements with
countries outside the region creates “variation” rather than integration.2
Since 1997, moreover, China has exploited this lack of market integration to attract
foreign direct investment away from ASEAN.3 And although ASEAN-China trade has
grown, the relationship is asymmetrical. Thus while the wealthier ASEAN states invest
heavily in China, China invests little in ASEAN. Where it does, it invests in the poorer
northern crescent of ASEAN, composed of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam
(CLMV)—countries that abut China’s south.
This trading relationship evidently reºects China’s comfort with ASEAN’s regional
cooperation norm. This leads us to Katsumata’s second criticism, namely, that we mis-
represent ASEAN’s success in socializing China to this norm. Yet the relationship is by
no means “win-win,” as Katsumata contends. Rather, it suits Chinese economic and
geopolitical interests by drawing the CLMV states into China’s economic orbit at the
expense of greater intra-ASEAN market integration.
An analogous pattern, as we argued in our article, may be discerned in China’s al-
leged comfort with the practice of regional security cooperation conducted via the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Since 1998 China’s diplomatic style has changed, but
its strategic interests have not. ASEAN norms have proved surprisingly accommodat-
ing to China’s revived interest in its precolonial, tributary sphere, rather than those
norms having socialized China. Indeed, as Katsumata somewhat contradictorily infers,
China’s attraction to multilateralism has cost it nothing. Thus in the case of the 2002
ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, the
declaration is not legally binding and does not require China to relinquish any aspect of
its purported sovereignty over the sea.
Nor is it surprising that China ªnds the ASEAN Way congenial to its interests.
ASEAN’s capstone Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which, as Katsumata notes, effec-
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tively excludes the United States from the region, serves China’s strategic interest.
Signiªcantly, ASEAN’s norm of noninterference in the internal affairs of member states
is indistinguishable from the principles of peaceful coexistence outlined by China’s for-
eign minister, Zhou Enlai, at the 1955 Bandung conference. The Bandung commitment
to “mutual nonaggression and noninterference in each other’s internal affairs” inºu-
enced the phraseology of the ASEAN treaty.4 Socializing its foreign relations to norms
that China devised represents a notable diplomatic achievement.
ASEAN may therefore claim that its ARF and ASEAN Plus 3 meetings inure China to
ASEAN’s norms. In reality, however, China uses ASEAN’s forums to advance its
worldview. Take, for example, ASEAN’s response to the question of Taiwan’s status.
When China joined the ARF, it was implicitly understood that the status of Taiwan
would not be discussed. Indeed, China did not participate in the 1993 and 1994 track-
two Conference on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Paciªc because of its continuing
anxiety about Taiwan’s status within the organization. In December 1996 ASEAN
reached an agreement that accommodated China’s concern. Eventually, at its 2004 sum-
mit with China, ASEAN endorsed the one-China policy.5 As the Taiwanese case shows,
China appeals to the form of East Asian regionalism to advance the substance of its
growing regional hegemony.
This becomes even more apparent when we consider Katsumata’s third concern: our
supposed obfuscation of the “human security/human rights” issue in Southeast Asia.
The only obscurity here, however, is Katsumata’s reasoning, which seems to vindicate
the success of ASEAN’s cooperative security norm on the grounds that it causes its
peoples misery.
Yet the support of authoritarian regimes and the abuse of human rights are inevitable
consequences of ASEAN norms. For example, the ruling junta of Myanmar’s violent
suppression of peaceful demonstrations in September 2007, coupled with its insouciant
response to the cyclone that devastated the Irawaddy Delta in February 2008, highlight
the role that regional organizations such as ASEAN and the East Asian Community fail
to play in confronting regimes that systematically violate human rights.
The ASEAN process, as we showed, studiously avoids a rule-based approach to mat-
ters of common concern and inhibits any supranational pooling of sovereignty. The
process was much in evidence during the negotiations that ASEAN undertook to estab-
lish, as Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo explained, “a mechanism so that aid can
ºow into Myanmar” under ASEAN auspices in the wake of Cyclone Nargis. Yeo
added, “It doesn’t make sense for us to . . . force aid on Myanmar.”6 Two weeks after
the cyclone, ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan claimed that ASEAN had
“worked 24/7 to raise a level of trust with the junta.”7
Sensitivity to the junta’s insecurity, however, might not have been the immediate
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concern of the starving masses of the Irawaddy Delta. All that the ASEAN Way
achieved, via its face-saving policy of constructive engagement, was to succor Burmese
autocracy.
Any pressure that has been brought to bear on the military junta comes from China,
which has displayed a studied disinterest in both human rights and democracy. In
other words, the intractability of the Myanmar question has further exempliªed
China’s growing regional hegemony since the ªnancial crisis of 1997 and its realpolitik
approach, which astutely exploits the ASEAN Way. Outmoded as the ASEAN Way
might appear, China’s fourth-generation leadership thus ªnds it inordinately useful to
emphasize its policy of “good neighborliness.” For the people of Myanmar or for any
prospect of a liberal regional order, such neighborliness offers little prospect of open
government, political accountability, or attention to humanitarian concerns. This evolu-
tion is neither complex nor obscure, but we would agree with Katsumata that it is a se-
rious concern.
—David Martin Jones
Queensland, Australia
—Michael L.R. Smith
London, United Kingdom
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